THE HUMAN STRIVLXG AND THE
CATEGORIES OF SCIENCE'
BY BENJAMIN GINZBURG

A

CERTAIN
that the

school of philosophers have tried to persuade us

human

striving, or the

moral consciousness, and the

principles of scientific reason have no relationship in

common.

It

but necessary to cast a glance at the history of pragmatism to
appreciate the inadequacy of such an assertion. In the original artiis

cle of C. S. Peirce

on

"How

to

Make Our

Ideas Clear,"

-

the argu-

ment concerned the principles of scientific method. After reviewing the notions of Bacon and Descartes, as well as the attempts of
lesser philosophers to legislate for science, the American mathematician came to the conclusion that it was necessary to bring reason
into the laboratory
much as Kepler had done when he painstakingly plotted every possible curve that could explain the movement
of Mars. From a discussion of the logic of science, pragmatism w^as

—

transformed into a philosophy of voluntaristic fideism. And even
if Mr. Dewey has attempted to swing the movement away from some
of the temperamental excesses of James, the fact remains that in the
pragmatic philosophy logic and moral striving are still very closely
united.

To
rible

be sure, the realistic critics have used pragmatism as the hoi
example of what happens when reasons of the heart are allowed

to interfere

with reasons of the

intellect.

And

it

certainly

is

true

pragmatism in many instances has weakened the authority of
the intellect, and has opened the door to all manner of affective
vagaries.
The same charge is applicable to the Bergsonian philosophy of the intuition, which beginning as a critique of scientific
orthodoxy has ended up as an apology for modernistic Catholicism.
Granted that these movements have been to a large extent intelthat

i.A.
critical discussion based on L' Experience Humainc et
Physique, by Leon Brunschvicg. Paris, Alcan, 1922, pp. 625, xvi.
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lectually destructive, the very fact tliat the

play such tricks

in

is

itself

the reasons of the heart

We

if

moral consciousness can

highly significant.

We

must deal with

make

only for their power to

cannot follow out the suggestion that Mr. Russell offers

Freeman's Worship."' and
no other

specific content

"The

heart cherish lofty thoughts with

than their mere loftiness.

The

heart refuses

way.

to be fooled that
If the

let otir

trouble.
in

moral striving cannot be permanently separated from our
and if the method of pragmatism and the method

intellectual activity,

of the Bergsonian intuition lead only to the l)reakdo\vn of intellectual

—

the union of love and
is yet the method of Spinoza
knowledge in the anwr del intcUcctitaUs. It is also the method of
Plato and the method of Kant. All three of these i)hilosoi)hcrs educated their sensibility by a devotion to science, instead of underminAll three
ing their reason by giving free rein to their sensibility.
authority, there

meditated the experience of mathematics.

"...

Truth." wrote

Spinoza, "might have lain hidden from the hun.an race through

all

had not Mathematics, which deals not in final causes but
the essences and properties of things, oft'ered to men another [and

eternity,
in

norm

veritable]

of truth."

"

^^"hat clearer illustration can be given of the gulf separating the

Spinozistic
in this

norm

of truth from the

norm

of pragmatism than to cite

connection the lines written in 1893 by William James to his

friend Flournoy?

"Pourcjuoi suis-je depourvu du sens mathcmati(|ue. Toutes les
propositions mathematiques me semblent non seulement inintelligiRenouvier m'a toujours contente par son exposibles. mai.-< fausscs.
tion et voila qu'il va falloir que je me remette a I'ecole." *
:

AMiile these lines are not meant to be taken too seriously, they

do give an aperQU of the motivation of the Jamesian temperameni
and M. Bnmschvicg is right in observing that "the J'arieties of Religious Experience would bear quite a different interpretation the
moment one understood that there exists Varieties of Mathematical
"

Experience, no

less fascinating

For the task of

and no

interj^reting the

less suggestive.

human

striving in

''

its

philosophic aspects, no writer could be better fitted than
schvicg.

multiple

M. Rrun-

Historian of Spinoza, commentator of Pascal, equipped

with the solid weapon of mathematical training as displayed

in his

-"Popular Science Monthly," Dec, 1877.
Cf. Van VIotcn and Land. vol. 1, p. 71.
F^thics, Part I, app.
*La J'ic ct I'Oeuvi'c dc Theodore flounwv, Archives dc Psvchologie, 1921,
•''

p. 95.

^L'Expi-r.

Hum.,

p.

xi.

—
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Etapes de la Philosophic MatJicniatiqiie. and nurtured in an intellectual atmosphere where science and philosophy have been brought
more and more together our author has used all these advantages

—

perform a difficult piece of work well. He has employed a method
which might be characterized as historical impressionism. Certainly
no method is more open to abuse than that of arriving at a point
of view by reading and commenting upon history. The danger of
to

reading into history one's
great, but

magnitude

its

is

own

assuredly very

is

In the case of AI. Brunschvicg. while his present

the historian.

work, L' Experience Humainc
ranked, and

preconceptions

inverse proportion to the erudition of

in

is

ct la Causalitc PJixsiqitc. is

not meant to be ranked as a historv,

that he has lived up, as well as any

mula he himself has

man

it

not to be

would seem

can, to the ambitious for-

writing:

set for all his

"Philosophy will know what men have believed, and why they
have believed in it it will say why there are certain propositions
which it is absurd to maintain in this day, others which it would be
no less absurd not to maintain. Philosophy will sum up the experience of thinking humanity, and this experience must be made complete by a test of truth, which will bring about discrimination between values, which will eliminate diversity ynd contradictions,
allowing to remain only the unique truth."
;

-'

M. Brunschvicg's
sophic
all

problem

time.

the

logical

us.

It

is

It

subject

is

at the heart of the

— one
is

might say
not merely a

absurdity

of

the validity of

the

cold

causal

science,

modern

philosophic

the

intellectual

relation

— that

the efficacity of

philo-

problem of
antinomy
concerns

human

effort

which are at stake. The crucial issues upon \vhich turned the warfare between religion and science in the seventeenth century and
between science and moral philosophy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries embrace this central paradox of causality.
It is easy
enough to take one side or another in the battle to be a dogmatic
scientific determinist and forget the troubles of the moral life, or to
believe in faith and deny the necessity of science.
But even when
human experience is thus artificially divided into water-tight compartments, new difficulties rise up in each section. The orthodox

—

principles of science lead to logical contradictions at every step.

as for faith,

it

lectual creed,

cannot get along by

itself

;

it

demands

And

a concrete intel-

and even apologetics must obey the rules of

logical

consistency.

For the solution of these multiple contradictions, there

is

no gen-

uine method other than the method of science and philosophy. This
'^Nature et Liberie, Paris, Flammarion, 1921, p. x.

:
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lesson

M. Brunschvicg has

lectual careers of Pascal

learned by a confrontation of the inteland Spinoza, and it was at the conclusion

of his studies on these philosoi)hers. published

summed up

in

1906, that he thus

the relation of reason to faith

"Reason is not an element of a synthesis which is to be established by a conij)romise between reason and faith it is the positive
function of the synthesis, while the role of faith is to occupy the
place of anticipation which reason is to reach, to provoke the effort
:

will make this reason equal to its own task."^
M. Brunschvicg's motive in writing his comprehensive

which

on causality
lines.

It is

obvious to the reader

who

Rut the knowledge of

civilization.

treatise

cares to look between the

to banish the ghost of scientific materialism

our modern
in

is

this

which haunts

motive does not

any way diminish the philosophic value of the work

— no

more

than a knowledge of Spinoza's psychology destroys the logical consistency of the Ethics.

Nearly a hundred pages are devoted to a consideration of the
These theories, bobbing up now and

doctrines of pure empiricism.

then in the course of history, have pretended to explain the organization of experience automatically without any intellectual effort or

contribution on

tlie

part of the

human mind.

Perhaps the most

John Stuart Mill, who
tried to derive the principles of induction by induction itself.
The
ancient empiricists were never so ambitious. Thus Sextus Empiricus
writes in the Advcrsiis Mathouaticos iW 104):
"If in medicin.we know that a lesion of the heart brings on death, it is not through
a single observation, but because after having observed the death
of Dion, we see the death of Theon. Socrates, and many others." *
In other words, empiricism was merely an upper limit to scepticism.
The case was different with Hume. Here we have a philosopher
who oscillated between extreme scepticism and extreme credulity.
After having challenged the efficacy of natural causality to such a
blatant exposition of empiricism

point as to destroy

all

is

that of

miity in experience, he good-naturedly re-

happy ending

in his philosophy bv bringing in the dcus
ex mochina of universal attraction or association an extension by
analogy of Newtonian gravitation.
In his historical judgment on
Hume. M. Brunschvicg follows the idealistic tradition according to
which the Scotch philosopher is important not for himself as for

established a

—

his relation to Kant.

Turning
riences,

to the intellectual or rationalistic organization of expe-

M. Brunschvicg

^Revue de Metanhysique
*

Cited hy Rninschvicg,

discusses the various sr.ccessive phases in
et
p.

de Mdrale. XI\', 1906.
5.

p.

731.
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section deals with

primitive peoples, and the author

takes the occasion to demolish the positivistic interpretation of

M.

Levy-Bruhl that the savage mentality is pre-logical. Relying upon
the same documentation as the sociological school, M. Brunschvicg
is able to show that what the savage mind lacks, just as what the
mediaeval mind lacked when it asserted that nature abhors a vacuum,
is

the mathematical tool by

which modern physics and the chemistry

of Lavoisier have built up fixed equations to support the observations

The savage mind

of the senses.

then pre-scientific but not neces-

is

sarily pre-logical.
It

is

in dealing

with ancient philosophy that M. Brunschvicg's

historical interpretation

is

put to a severe

The

test.

for the Aristotelian finalism, Avhich dominated the
for twenty centuries,
cal philosophy.

The

is

responsibility

Western world

traced to the failure of Plato's mathemati-

mechanism

issue of

there Avhen Aristotle

came on

oped mechanism, but

this

was already
had devel-

vs. finalism

The

the scene.

naturalists

philosophy proved fruitless for the reason

which alone

that the ancients lacked the instrument of calculation

made modern

has

science successful.

the practical moral philosophy.
alternatives,

and

tried to find a

Plato

way

Finalism had grown out of

saw

the weakness of both

out by the path that Pythagoras

had traced, but, finding himself unable to render account of change
and becoming by the eternal essences of either numbers or ideas, he
introduces the notion of the demi-urge as the ordinator of the universe.

There was nothing

left for Aristotle to do.

but to register

the defeat of Plato, and to conciliate in eclectic fashion both finalism

and mechanism.

The Cartesian

revolution

is

hailed by the author as a triumph

of mathematics over scholasticism.

Its

great virtue

metricised physics at the same time that
algebra.

The

it

is

that

it

geo-

reduced geometry to

essence of Cartesian rationalism

is

that

it

abandoned

the search for the real causes of mechanical action but set itself

This philosophic gain was compromised by the subsequent development of Newtonian physics with
the task of observing relations.

its

action at a distance.

"The hope which

after Descartes the seventeenth century had

been able to form, that of finding

in the

mechanistic conception of

was
Not only do we observe, with Leibnitz and with Newthe return of that notion of force which seemed to have been

the universe a definitive solution of the problem of causality,

not realized.
ton,

chased out of philosophy by the discredit of the scholastic tradition,

TIIK ()I>KN

341-

(orKT

two

but this revival comes about tbroui^'b
to

two

wbich lead

different ways,

Tbe

Leib-

rejjarded as imaginary by tbe

New-

nations of force, incompatible eacli witb ibe otber.

nitzian notion of active force

tonians, because

is

proceeds from a metaj^bysical speculation, tbe

it

truth of wbicb has not been submitted to
tonian or post-Xewtonian notion of force

a test of facts
is

;

the

New-

regarded as imaginary

by the Leibnitzians because it does not satisfy the conditions of
A double conspatial contact required by scientific comprehension.
has to be resolved by the eighteenth century

flict

:

inside of rational

mechanism and d\namism between Caron the other hand inside of dynamisnr?.
and
Leibnitzians
tesians and
mathematicism
and experimental mathemetaphysical
of
the conflict
mechanics, the conflict of
:

maticism."

^

we know, removed by Kant, and the
Without renouncing in any way the Carprinciple that for the speculative knowledge of the universe

Part of this conflict was. as
doctrine of the a-priori.
tesian

there exists but one type of truth, that of mathematics, the Kantian
criticism bridged the gap between mathematics and physics by means

of the forms of the intuition.

On

the experimental side the prob-

by the Xewtonian cosmology were not really solved until
From his point of viewthe development of Einsteinian relativity.
as a critical idealist. M. Crunschvicg takes no pains to conceal the
jov with which he greets the new physics. The concept of energy
lems

set

has long since been regarded as nothing more than a mathematical
integral, and now w-e are able at last to reduce gravity— this occult

—

to geometry and differential equations.
remain obstacles in the way of mathematical
idealism as a philosophy of science. There is the obstreperous quantum theorv. which challenges the hypothesis of mathematical con-

force acting at a distance

To

be sure there

tinuity.

And

there

vicissitudes, has

Jean Perrin.
ured,

still

is

now

P>ut

the atomic hypothesis, which after

gained

new

strength through the

its

various

work

not yet reached the cosmological ultimate of

we have

of

M.

even though the atom has been counted and meas-

Dem-

ocritus.

eternal and indiset a limit to the
possible, and. in their unimaginable smallness. we commence to
anticipate a prodigious swarming of new worlds. Thus the astronomer, with his head growing dizzy at the sight, discovers beyond
the familiar skies, beyond the abysses of shadow that light takes

"The atoms," writes M. Perrin, "are not these
whose irreduciljle simplicity would

visible elements

milleniums to traverse^ pale flakes
i^rabiy distant,
'•/hid., p.

251.

whose

feeble

lost in space,

glimmer

milky ways, immeas-

yet reveals to us the palpitation
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of millions of giant stars. Nature employs the same limitless splendor both in the Atom and in the Xebnlus, and every new instrument
of knowledge shows her to be more vast and variegated, more
fecond, more unexpected, more beautiful, more rich in its fathomless

immensity."

^^

against the background of

It is

M. Brunschvicg

modern mathematical physics that
Shunning meta-

paints his personal philosophy

is content with a philosophy of human experience, a philosophy whose sole aim is to reflect upon the progress of thought
with a view to dispel prejudices and to face the future with a confidence of an understanding of the past.

physics, he

"The comprehension of scientific knowledge demands an effort
of reflexion upon the perspective according to wliich the spirit disposes both the notions which will be the instnmient of its conquest
and the data through which experience answers its questions, upon
the manner in which the adaptation of the measure to the thing
measured permits of establishing a connection and harmony between
the notions of rational order and the facts of the experimental order
And we shall grasp the secret of this perspective only if we know
how to plunge ourselves into the remote past of history, if we see
how, by the elan of invention and by the unexpected reaction of
observation, have been developed, crystalized, and then broken, the
notions which serve to put the problem of the universe into equations, how the methods have been remodeled, and refined in order
to give the means for perfectioning endlessly the approximation of
^^
the solutions already attained."

The philosophy

of

M. Brunschvicg opposes

with equal

itself

and

rigor both to the conceptualism of classic rationalism

modern

anti-intellectualism.

From

to the

Lachelier he has acquired the

is the ultimate term of human thought, and
from Emile Boutroux he has borrowed the idea of contingency in
the laws of nature. Out of such elements he has constructed a twofold philosophy of Socratic humanism in morals and m.ithematical

doctrine that judgment

determinism

in the

world of

science.

Both are possible the moment

one realizes that determinism does not mean predeterimnisui.

determinism means nothing more than the act of the
in organizing objectively

th;i'

human mind

and mathematically the external world

int''"

a system.
Is this

subjectivism of the type of pragmatism?

"This might be true if before perception and before the universe
humanity was already something entirely given and entirely developed, in such a way that by starting with this complete notion of
man and by defining the structure of his sensibility and intellect,
perception and science would be explained, as subjective sxntheses
'^^Lcs

Aiomes, Paris, Alcan, 1913,

'^^L'Exper.

Hum.,

p.

570.

p.

291.

Cf. Brunschvicg,

p.

392.
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Now ...

indeed the concej)tion which reaHsm forms of
order to bolster up its polemic, it is far from the verifable interpretation of idealism, at least since the advent of modern
psychologn>' and critical reflexion.
Man is not known before the uni
verse; we do not know ourselves as individuals occupying^ a porlion
of space and living in time except after having organized
except
through organizing our visual and tactual impressions in such a
manner as to give us a plurality of mobile objects across the succession of decorations which dominate our horizon and we take cognizance of ourselves as being objects among objects. If we did not
succeed in putting a reasonable order in the world surrounding us, we
should not become ourselves, for ourselves, reasonable beings.
According to the expression of Jules Lachelier: 'Incoherence out-

ideahsm

if sucli is

in

—

—

;

^is madness inside'."
Because reason has grown out of experience and has been refined
by experience gives no license to the pragmatic fallacv of regarding
experience as an absolute.
Brute experience is by itself a negation, a point of resistance, which becomes significant only when it
is transformed into an intellectual point of departure.
So, too. the
moral philosophy of action which has been so largely encouraged by

side

pragmatism reveals
it

itself as

an inadequate guide precisely because

emphasizes the wrong phase of the

"The

human

dialectical process.

often happens that a man
who is introduced to another values this new friend more highly
than he does the person who gave him the introduction, so in like
manner it is by no means surprising that though we are first introduced to Wisdom by the primary impulses of Nature, afterwards
Wisdom itself becomes dearer than are the impulses by which we
came to her." ^^
As one beholds M. Brunschvicg's remarkable efi'ort at philoStoics used to say that just as

it

sophic synthesis, one begins to realize the growing complexity of

modern thought,

a complexity to M'hich the doctrinaire schools of

heed.
The problem is not so simple as realism
any more than the problem of political government in
America is exhausted by the alternative of the Republican or Democratic parties.
Nor is the practical solution of pragmatism of much
use to the student who is interested in understanding reality in all
its refinement and subtlety.
There is indeed no alternative than to study each phase of modern thought in its historical becoming. It is a task requiring encyclopedic knowledge and more than that, the artist's power of creative
synthesis. For the philosopher, too, is an artist, having in his charge
the continual remoulding of the intellectual and moral consciences

philosophy pay

little

vs. idealism,

of humanity.
i2/fe,rf., p.

610.

''Cicero,

De

finihus, III,

7.

Cf. Brunschvicg,

p.

614.

